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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. 
LIVIO RAMIREZ, : Case No. 900439-CA 
Priority #2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Honorable 
Robin W. Reese, Third Circuit Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. A jury found Mr. Ramirez guilty of Interference With 
a Peace Officer Making a Lawful Arrest, a Class B Misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1990) after a trial held on 
June 22, 1990. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(d) (Supp. 1990) and Rule 26(2)(a), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (1990) whereby a defendant in a criminal action 
in Circuit Court may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a 
final judgment and conviction. In this case, final judgment and 
conviction were rendered by the Honorable Robin W. Reese, Judge, 
Third Circuit Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
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TEXTS OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment IV, Constitution of the United States: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14, Constitution of the State of Utah: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann., Section 76-8-305: 
A person is guilty of a Class B Misdemeanor if 
he has knowledge, or by the exercise of 
reasonable care, should have knowledge, that a 
peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful 
arrest or detention of himself or another and 
interferes with such arrest or detention by use 
of force or by use of any weapon. 
Utah Code Ann., Section 77-7-2: 
A peace officer may make an arrest under 
authority of a warrant or may, without warrant, 
arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or 
attempted in the presence of any peace 
officer; "presence" includes all of the 
physical senses or any device that enhances 
the activity, sensitivity, or range of any 
physical sense, or records the observations of 
any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a 
felony has been committed and has reasonable 
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cause to believe that the person arrested has 
committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe 
the person has committed a public offense, and 
there is reasonable cause for believing the 
person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid 
arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the 
commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage 
property belonging to another person. 
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STATEMENT OP THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court err by denying defendant's pretrial 
motion to suppress evidence based on an illegal entry of his home, 
or in the alternative allow the jury to be instructed that since the 
entry was illegal the defendant had a right to reasonably resist any 
arrest that followed upon the illegal entry? 
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STATEMENT OF THE PACTS 
On May 18, 1990, Livio Ramirez had a few friends and family 
over to celebrate his sister's baby's birthday (R. 95 at 69). After 
his guests left his house and went to their cars, Livio's brother 
Gabriel got in an argument with their brother-in-law James (R. 95 at 
69). Gabriel and James left on foot and Livio went to calm Gabriel 
down (R. 95 at 69). He found Gabriel and James near Trolley Square 
(R. 95 at 69). 
Officer Smith was on duty at the time assisting a Channel 4 
News crew near Trolley Square (R. 94 at 4). Officer Smith observed 
two individuals arguing, and one of these two men swung at a third 
who approached the area (R. 94 at 5). Officer Smith identified 
himself and the larger of the two men said something to him (R. 94 
at 5). Both individuals were intoxicated (Id.) . While Officer 
Smith radioed for backup, a barricade was thrown into the side 
window of his car (R. 94 at 6). Officer Smith identified Gabriel as 
the most aggressive one of the two, the one who had swung at the 
third party (R. 94 at 8). Livio was identified as having been vocal 
but not violent toward anyone (R. 94 at 8). 
At this point, Gabriel and Livio started to run and Officer 
Smith ran after them (R. 94 at 7). He and one of the backup 
officers, Officer Bigelow, caught Gabriel and Livio continued to run 
(R. 94 at 7). Officer Smith chose to follow Gabriel, because he 
believed that Gabriel had been the one to throw the barricade (R. 94 
at 8) . 
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Officer Rowley arrived on the scene with Officer Bigelow 
and saw Officers Smith and Rowley apprehend Gabriel (R. 94 at 16). 
Officer Rowley had responded to the scene to backup Officer Smith, 
because he was having trouble with na drunk" (R. 94 at 19). Officer 
Smith followed Livio into a house through the front door and into 
the living room area (R. 94 at 17-18). 
Within seconds of entering the house, Officer Rowley 
approached Livio past Livio's dog who was barking and snapping (R. 
95 at 61-62). As Officer Rowley grabbed Livio, he was bitten by 
Livio's dog (R. 95 at 64). Almost immediately, Officer Heaps 
arrived, and the two of them tried to cuff Livio, who would not 
cooperate by letting the officers get to his hands (R. 95 at 57-59). 
Gabriel was charged with the damage to Officer Smith's 
vehicle (R. 95 at 46-47), and Livio was charged with Assault on a 
Peace Officer and Interference with a Peace Officer Making a Lawful 
Arrest (R. 95 at 26). At a jury trial on June 22, 1990, Livio was 
acquitted of the Assault charge and convicted of the Interference 
charge (R. 67, 68 and 95 at 136). The Assault charge was based on 
Livio having allegedly said "sic'em" or "get'em" to his dog as 
Officer Rowley approached (R. 95 at 125-126). 
Mr. Ramirez, by means of pretrial motion (R. 27-28), asked 
the trial court to exclude all evidence following Officer Rowley's 
illegal entry into his home and dismiss the charges against him (R. 
94 at 25) or in the alternative to instruct the jury that since the 
entry was illegal, Mr. Ramirez had a right to reasonably resist any 
arrest that followed (R. 94 at 34-35). The motion was raised under 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
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Constitution and case law concerning "hot pursuit" (R. 94 at 23) and 
the right to reasonably resist unlawful arrest (R. 94 at 26). In 
addition, the trial court was asked to consider the extra protection 
afforded individuals by Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution as explained in State v. Larocco/ (R. 94 at 24). The 
motion was taken under advisement. 
On the day of trial, the motion was denied (R. 95 at 3), 
because it would be bad public policy to allow such resistance even 
if reasonable (Id.). The court found the entry was legal, (R. 95 at 
96) and that in any case there was no right to resist an arrest 
following an illegal entry (R. 95 at 98-99). 
Defendant's offered instruction, number 22, on right to 
resist was withdrawn reserving the right to appeal the decision of 
the court (R. 41 and 95 at 135-36). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Ramirez1 right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures was violated in this case. The Utah Code is silent on 
an officer's rights in this exact situation; therefore, Officer 
Rowley did not have statutory authority to enter Mr. Ramirez' home. 
Any interpretation of the Utah Code to include this situation, 
however, would run afoul of both the Utah and United States 
constitutions. Officer Rowley had no warrant, his probable cause to 
believe Mr. Ramirez had committed any crime was tenuous, the crime 
he could connect Mr. Ramirez to at all was minor, and the only 
exigency was that Mr. Ramirez was in flight when first sighted. 
The "hot pursuit" exception to the warrant requirement does not 
apply in circumstances such as these under either the state or 
federal constitution. 
Since Officer Rowley could not be inside Mr. Ramirez' home, 
the case against Mr. Ramirez for Interference with a Police Officer 
should have been dismissed pursuant to the trial court suppressing 
all evidence following the illegal entry. Even if the Court is 
reluctant to grant this remedy, however, the trial court should have 
allowed an instruction on the defendant's right to resist an arrest 
based on the illegal entry of his home. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT: The trial court erred when it denied Mr, Ramirez1 
pretrial motion to suppress evidence or in the 
alternative instruct the jury that he had a fTght 
to reasonably resist the arrest following an 
illegal entry. 
[Pjhysical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment 
is directed. 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (citations omitted). 
To be arrested in the home involves not only the 
invasion attendant to all arrests but also an 
invasion of the sanctity of the home. This is 
simply too substantial an invasion to allow 
without a warrant, at least in the absence of 
exigent circumstances, even when it is 
accomplished under statutory authority and when 
probable cause is clearly present. 
Id. at 588-89 (citations omitted). 
In the present case, Mr. Ramirez was arrested in his home 
following a warrantless entry without consent into his home by 
Officer Rowley. The State must show that such entry was 
accomplished under statutory authority, with clear probable cause 
and in the face of exigent circumstances. Id. If the State cannot 
persuade this Court that the denial created no error involving a 
constitutional right, then that error can be considered harmless 
only if the reviewing court is persuaded by the State beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
A. Officer Rowley's entry of Mr. Ramirez1 home 
was illegal. 
As has been noted above, there are three requirements that 
must be present to support the warrantless entry of Mr. Ramirez' 
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home. Mr. Ramirez contends that none of the three are strongly 
present, but he need only show that the State cannot prove all are 
present. 
1. Officer Rowley's entry was not supported by 
Statutory authority. 
Chapter 7 of Title 7 of the Utah Code provides the 
statutory authority for arrests in the state (see Addendum A for a 
reproduction of a portion of the chapter). Utah Code Ann. §77-7-2 
provides the framework for a warrantless arrest. Section (1) allows 
for a warrantless arrest by a peace officer, if a public offense is 
committed or attempted in the presence of any peace officer. 
Section (2) allows for such an arrest, if the arresting officer has 
reasonable cause to believe both that a felony has been committed 
and that the arrested person is the person who committed the 
felony. Section (3) allows such an arrest if the officer has 
reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a public 
offense and there is reasonable cause to believe the person might 
avoid arrest by flight or concealment. 
Officer Smith observed Gabriel Ramirez swing at a person on 
the street near Trolley Square (R. 94 at 4-5). Gabriel was observed 
to be aggressive or violent (R. 94 at 8) and was assumed by Officer 
Smith to be the one who threw the barricade (R. 94 at 8). Livio was 
possibly intoxicated (R. 94 at 5) and was vocal but not violent (R. 
94 at 8). And this was consistent with the actions of someone who 
was trying to calm an aggressive friend down. 
Officer Smith was the officer who observed Mr. Ramirez1 
initial actions. Mr. Ramirez was at most intoxicated according to 
Officer Smith's testimony. Section (1) would allow Officer Rowley 
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to arrest Mr. Ramirez, if Officer Smith observed Mr. Livio Ramirez 
commit a public offense. Officer Smith did not see Livio or Gabriel 
throw the barricade, but he assumed Gabriel had, since Gabriel had 
been the aggressive one of the two men. Gabriel, not Livio, had 
been vocally abusive or aggressive physically. Section (1) does not 
give Officer Rowley authority to arrest Mr. Ramirez, since Officer 
Smith had no such authority. 
Under Section (2) Officer Rowley would have to personally 
have reasonable cause to believe Mr. Livio Ramirez had committed a 
felony. Officer Rowley may have had reasonable suspicion that Mr. 
Ramirez was involved in a crime, but he did not have reasonable 
cause to believe a felony had been committed. 
Section (3) is arguably the best support for an arrest of 
Mr. Ramirez. Officer Rowley knew Livio was in flight to avoid 
Officer Smith. However, reasonable cause is a higher standard than 
reasonable suspicion and at most Officer Rowley had only reasonable 
articulable suspicion to stop Mr. Ramirez to see if he had indeed 
been involved in a crime. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
Therefore, even Section (3) does not support the arrest. At most 
Officer Rowley could stop Mr. Ramirez pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§77-7-15, which allows a stop for reasonable suspicion, but the stop 
may occur only in a public place. 
However, even if this Court finds authority for the arrest 
under §77-7-2 the inquiry does not stop there because the chapter 
goes on to talk about entry into a home. §77-7-5 allows for a night 
arrest for a misdemeanor under a warrant, only if the warrant 
specifically allows a night arrest, or if the person is in a 
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public place, or if the person is encountered by an officer 
performing another lawful act pursuant to his or her duties. 
Officer Rowley could not have arrested Mr. Ramirez in his home for a 
misdemeanor with a warrant in this situation, unless otherwise 
authorized. It cannot be argued then that the Utah Code provides 
affirmatively for Mr. Ramirez1 warrantless arrest in his own home 
under these circumstances, since more protection is available to a 
person if no warrant is in existence. 
2. Clear probable cause to arrest Mr. Ramirez 
was not present. 
Probable cause exists for an arrest, when an officer does 
not see the offense being committed, when 
from the facts known to the officer, and the 
inferences which fairly might be drawn therefrom, 
a reasonable and prudent person would be 
justified in believing that the suspect had 
committed the offense. 
State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App. 1988) (citations 
omitted). 
The law enforcement officer need not have certain 
knowledge of the guilt of the suspect. 
Id. However, the person arrested must be in "same fashion related" 
to the crime for which probable cause exists. Id. 
The problem in the present case is twofold. Officer Rov, ey 
did not have probable cause to believe any particular crime had been 
committed. Officer Smith witnessed a vandalism and suspected that 
Gabriel Ramirez had committed the crime. Therefore there is not 
probable cause to believe Livio had committed that particular crime 
which definitely had occurred. The connection between crime and 
suspect was weak and that form of relationship probable cause did 
not exist. 
Mr. Ramirez was observed to be intoxicated (R. 94 at 5) and 
vocal (R. 94 at 8). He could have been stopped for further 
investigation into a public intoxication charge. Here the probable 
cause that a public offense had been committed was weak. 
The State can show only weak probable cause of a crime 
committed by Mr. Ramirez. Officer Rowley himself testified at trial 
that he was trying to talk to Livio, during the initial contact 
inside the home (R. 94 at 55). Officer Rowley was in the home to 
find out what had happened, not to arrest Mr. Ramirez. 
3. Exigent circumstances for a warrantless entry 
were not present. 
[Ejxceptions to the warrant requirement are few 
in number and carefully delineatedf.] 
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984) (citations omitted). 
Once such exception is the existence of probable cause and exigent 
circumstances. Welsh, at 749, citing Payton at 583-590. An area of 
this exception is known as "hot pursuit" and applies when an officer 
chases a suspect into his or her home. Welsh at 750. Prior to 
Welsh the United States Supreme Court applied "hot pursuit" only to 
a fleeing felon. Welsh at 750; citing United States v. Santana 427 
U.S. 38 (1976); and Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). The 
Welsh Court refused to consider the question of whether "hot 
pursuit" should be limited to pursuit of fleeing felons; Welsh at 
749 n.ll. However, the Court in dicta pointed out to the 
"importance of the felony limitation on such arrests." Welsh at 
750, n.12. 
When the government's interest is only to 
arrest for a minor offense, that presumption of 
unreasonableness [of such an entry] is difficult 
to rebut, and the government usually should be 
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allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant 
issued upon probable cause by a neutral and 
detached magistrate. 
Welsh at 750. This is because the suppression of a minor crime is 
not 
more important than the security of the people 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. When 
an officer undertakes to act as his own 
magistrate, he ought to be in a position to 
justify it by pointing to some real immediate and 
serious consequences if he postponed action to 
get a warrant. 
Welsh at 751 (citation omitted). 
The Court in Welsh was talking about the crime of driving 
under the influence. Here the only possible crime Livio can be 
clearly connected to is public intoxication and the probable cause 
is weak, as noted above. This is not the kind of crime that should 
allow the "hot pursuit" by a police officer into the home of a 
fleeing person. Other states have adopted this approach and 
disallowed "hot pursuit" for driving through a red light, City of 
Seattle v. Altshuler, 766 P.2d 518 (Wash.App. 1989), for misdemeanor 
assault, Masden v. State, 294 S.W.2d 228 (Tex.Cr.App. 1951), and 
speeding, People v. Strelow, 292 N.W.2d 517 (Mich.App. 1980). 
Altshuler points to eleven factors involved in a 
determination if exigent circumstances are present: 
(1) the gravity of the offense; 
(2) whether or not the suspect is armed; 
(3) reasonably trustworthy information as to the suspect's 
guilt; 
(4) is the suspect on the premises; 
(5) fear that the suspect will escape; 
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(6) peaceable entry; 
(7) hot pursuit; 
(8) fleeing suspect; 
(9) danger to officer or public; 
(10) mobility of any vehicle involved; 
(11) mobility or destructibility of evidence. 
Altshuler at 520. Numbers 10 and 11 do not apply here. Numbers 4, 
7 in its nontechnical sense, and 8 are clearly present. Numbers 1, 
3 and 6 are clearly not present. Numbers 2, 5 and 9 are unclear in 
the officer's mind, but it is clear from the overall picture that 
these factors are not present. Gabriel may have shown himself to be 
dangerous, but Livio did not. It is likely he would have stayed put 
once entering his house. Exigent circumstances did not clearly 
exist here. 
It should also be pointed out that the Utah Supreme Court 
has found a stronger requirement of exigent circumstances under 
Article I, Section 14, when the case law under the federal 
constitution is unclear. State v. Larocco, 294 P.2d 460, 466-70 
(Utah 1990). Although the Larocco case considers the need for 
exigent circumstances in the search of an unattended car, Mr. 
Ramirez urges this Court to apply it to this circumstance, if no 
clarity is found in the case law under the federal constitution. 
The concerns mentioned in Welsh are present here, and the case can 
be decided under the Fourth Amendment or the stronger protections of 
Article I, Section 14. The "traditional" justification for 
warrantless seizures were not present here, 
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namely to protect the safety of the police or the 
public, or to prevent the destruction of evidence. 
Larocco at 470. Gabriel, not Livio, was a danger to the police and 
public. 
For the above reasons, Mr. Ramirez asks this Court to 
suppress all evidence following the illegal entry in this case and 
order a dismissal. See State v. Gallagher, 465 A.2d 323, 326 (Conn. 
1983). 
B. Mr. Ramirez had a right to reasonably resist 
the arrest that followed upon the illegal entry 
to his home. 
Even if the Court does not feel that evidence should be 
suppressed pursuant to the illegal entry, Mr. Ramirez asks that he 
should be allowed a remand for new trial with the right to instruct 
the jury that the entry was illegal and that Mr. Ramirez had a right 
to reasonably resist any arrest that immediately followed upon the 
illegal entry. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has recognized the right of a 
person to reasonably resist an illegal arrest based upon both 
Article I, Section 14, and the Fourth Amendment. State v. Bradshaw, 
541 P.2d 800, 801-02 (Utah 1975), and 802-04 (Henriod j, 
concurring); see also White v. Morris, 345 So.2d 461, 465-67 (La. 
1977) finding the right to resist under the Fourth Amendment and 
Louisiana's own constitution with its broader protections. In 
Bradshaw the officer in question told a citizen he was going to 
ticket him for driving on suspension, which in fact, was untrue. 
When approached, the citizen told the officer off and walked away. 
The Supreme Court ordered Mr. Bradshaw's conviction for interference 
reversed. 
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In the present case, Officer Rowley entered illegally. The 
officer approached Mr. Ramirez to apprehend him and while doing so 
felt that he had been assaulted because Mr. Ramirez1 dog bit him. 
(R. 95 at 64). Officer Heaps and Rowley wrestled Mr. Ramirez to the 
ground (R. 95 at 57-59). The only resistance offered by Mr. Ramirez 
was that he would not let the officers grab his hands to cuff him. 
(Id.) . This is reasonable resistance to the officers' activities. 
Mr. Ramirez had done nothing wrong on the street in front of Trolley 
Square other than trying to calm his brother down. When his brother 
threw the barricade, he ran into his house. Officer Rowley had no 
right to be in Livio's house. And, when the officers attempted to 
cuff him after they threw him to the ground, Livio merely refused 
for a few minutes to let the cuffing take place. Mr. Ramirez did 
not strike at the officers or otherwise hurt them. 
Mr. Ramirez asks the Court to find that his resistance was 
a reasonable reaction, not to an illegal arrest, but to an illegal 
entry of his home which makes the arrest illegal. Other states have 
applied this principle in cases similar to this one. In Gallagher, 
at 328, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that there is a right to 
resist an arrest following an illegal entry of a home. The illegal 
entry in Gallagher, was based on the officer's gaining consent to 
enter by trickery. The resistance was based on Mr. Gallagher's 
refusal to leave his home, when arrested by the officers, and the 
fight that ensued between the officers and Mr. and Mrs. Gallagher. 
In People of Garden City v. Stark, 372 N.W.2d 474 (Mich.App. 1982), 
officers were trying to arrest a third party nonresident in a 
house. They did not have a warrant and a fight broke out once they 
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entered the house. Mr. Ramirez1 actions are less egregious than the 
actions of defendants in these other two cases. He refused to call 
his dog off, if he had any such power to do so given the fact he was 
being handled roughly by strangers in his own home. Mr. Ramirez 
took no affirmative actions to hurt the officers. He had a right to 
such reasonable resistance. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, Livio 
Ramirez, respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and grant his pretrial motion to suppress all evidence 
obtained after the illegal entry or in the alternative remand the 
case for a new trial allowing the jury to be instructed on 
defendant's right to reasonably resist arrest following an illegal 
entry of his home. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this QU day of October, 1990. 
ROBERT L. STEELE " 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
77-6-9 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
History: C. 1953, 77-6-8, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
"Convicted." 
Interpretation of term "convicted" to mean a 
determination by the court that the accusa-
tions constituting the basis for removal were 
true, as opposed to the alternative basis for 
judgment of removal, the defendant's admis-
sion, would reconcile this section with 
§ 77-6-7. Madesen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086 
(Utah 1985). 
77-6-9. Appeal — Suspension from office. 
From a judgment of removal an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court 
in the same manner as from a judgment in a civil action; but from entry of 
judgment and until the judgment is reversed, the defendant shall be sus-
pended from his office. Pending the appeal, the office shall be filled as in the 
case of a vacancy. 
History: C. 1953, 77-6-9, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Writ of prohibition. 
If accusation against county attorney 
charged acts not legally prohibited, and, there-
fore, court had no jurisdiction, officer's remedy 
by appeal was inadequate because he could be 
removed from office upon accusation having no 
foundation in law; accordingly, Supreme Court 
could issue writ of prohibition to prevent re-
moval. Parker v. Morgan, 48 Utah 405,160 P. 
764 (1916). 
Where a city commissioner was found guilty 
of malfeasance in office by a jury verdict and 
petitioned for an extraordinary writ to prohibit 
the district court from entering judgment be-
cause the effect thereof would be to remove 
him from office pending an appeal, the Su-
preme Court held that the writ of prohibition 
should not be granted since to do so would re-
sult in circumventing the intended purpose of 
this section. Geurts v. District Court, 10 Utah 
2d 319, 352 P.2d 778 (1960). 
CHAPTER 7 
ARREST, BY WHOM, AND HOW MADE 
Section 
77-7-1. "Arrest" defined — Restraint al-
lowed. 
77-7-2. By peace officers. 
77-7-3. By private persons. 
77-7-4. Magistrate may orally order arrest. 
77-7-5. Issuance of warrant — Time and 
place arrests may be made. 
77-7-5.5. Fee for warrant service. 
77-7-6. Manner of making arrest. 
77-7-7. Force in making arrest. 
77-7-8. Doors and windows may be broken, 
when. 
77-7-9. Weapons may be taken from pris-
oner. 
77-7-10. Telegraph or telephone authoriza-
Section 
77-7-11. 
77-7-12. 
77-7-13. 
77-7-14. 
tion of execution of arrest war-
rant. 
Possession of warrant by arresting 
officer not required. 
Detaining persons suspected of shop-
lifting or library theft — Persons 
authorized. 
Arrest without warrant by peace of-
ficer — Reasonable grounds, what 
constitutes — Exemption from 
civil or criminal liability. 
Person causing detention or arrest of 
person suspected of shoplifting or 
library theft — Civil and criminal 
immunity. 
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Section 
77-7-15. 
77-7-16. 
77-7-17. 
77-7-18. 
77-7-19. 
Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect — Grounds. 
Authority of peace officer to frisk 
suspect for dangerous weapon — 
Grounds. 
Authority of peace officer to take 
possession of weapons. 
Citation on misdemeanor or infrac-
tion charge. 
Appearance before magistrate — 
Failure to appear — Transfer of 
cases — Motor vehicle violations. 
Section 
77-7-20. 
77-7-21. 
77-7-22. 
77-7-23. 
Service of citation on defendant — 
Filing in court — Contents of cita-
tions. 
Proceeding on citation — Voluntary 
forfeiture of bail — Information, 
when required. 
Failure to appear as misdemeanor. 
Delivery of prisoner arrested with-
out warrant to magistrate — 
Transfer to court with jurisdiction 
— Violation as misdemeanor. 
77-7-1. "Arrest" defined — Restraint allowed. 
An arrest is an actual restraint of the person arrested or submission to 
custody. The person shall not be subjected to any more restraint than is neces-
sary for his arrest and detention. 
History: C. 1953, 77-7-1, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
Cross-References. — Legislators privileged 
from arrest, exceptions, Utah Const. Art. VI, 
§ 8. 
National Guard members privileged from ar-
rest at certain times, exceptions, § 39-1-54. 
State guard, exemption from arrest while on 
duty, exceptions, § 39-4-12. 
Unlawful detention a misdemeanor, 
§ 76-5-304. 
Voters privileged from arrest on election 
day, exceptions, Utah Const. Art. IV, § 3. 
Witnesses obeying summons not subject to 
arrest, § 77-21-5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
What constitutes "arrest" 
An arrest could not be made without the 
presence of an intention on the part of the ar-
resting officer to make the arrest; notice of ar-
rest should have been given, either expressly 
or by implication, and without such notice no 
amount of physical restraint could constitute 
an arrest. State v. Beckendorf, 79 Utah 360,10 
P.2d 1073 (1932). 
An arrest must have been made in the man-
ner authorized by law. Wright v. Lee, 104 Utah 
90, 138 P.2d 246 (1943). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Comment, Arrest 
Record Expungement — A Function of the 
Criminal Court, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 381. 
Note: Detention, Arrest, and Salt Lake City 
Police Practices, 9 Utah L. Rev. 593. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 1 et 
seq. 
C.J.S. — 6A CJ.S. Arrest § 1 et seq. 
Key Numbers. — Arrest «=» 1 et seq. 
77-7-2. By peace officers. 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, 
without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of 
any peace officer; presence" includes all of the physical senses or any 
device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical 
sense, or records the observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has been commit-
ted and has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has 
committed it; 
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(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed 
a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person 
may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another 
person. 
History: C. 1953, 77-7-2, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1985, ch. 192, § 1; 1986, ch. 
161, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, effective March 17, 1986, deleted "other 
than offenses under Title 41 where any non-ju-
risdictional element of the offense is" preced-
ing "committed or attempted" in Subsection 
(1). 
Cross-References. — Children, grounds for 
taking into custody, § 78-3a-29. 
City police officers' arrest powers, 
§§ 10-3-914, 10-3-915, 10-3-919. 
Conservation officers' authority, §§ 23-20-1, 
23-20-1.5. 
ANALYSIS 
Arrest without warrant. 
—Misdemeanor. 
Authority to sign complaint. 
False imprisonment. 
Instructions. 
"Public offense." 
Reasonable cause. 
Seizure of goods in making arrest. 
Cited. 
Arrest without warrant 
Police officers were authorized to make a 
warrantless arrest of defendant for violation of 
parole occasioned by association with known 
felons and attempted flight to avoid arrest 
where the officers had been notified by a reli-
able informant of the location of a house trailer 
containing an escaped prison convict and other 
parolees» defendant was identified as a parolee 
by an officer at the scene and was observed to 
make several trips into the trailer, and when 
the officers ordered the occupants of the trailer 
to surrender, the defendant came out, sounded 
the horn on his automobile in an attempt to 
alert the other occupants of the trailer, and 
attempted to drive away. State v. Kent, 665 
P.2d 1317 (Utah 1983). 
Officers had probable cause to arrest based 
on controlled buys of narcotics which had been 
conducted prior to the search. State v. Banks, 
720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986). 
Force which peace officer may use in making 
arrest, §§ 76-2-404, 77-7-7. 
Highway patrol, arrest power, § 27-10-5. 
Livestock brand inspectors' powers, 
§ 4-24-28. 
Motor Carrier Act, arrests to enforce, 
§§ 54-6-44, 54-6-45. 
Sheriffs power to arrest, §§ 17-22-2(l)(b). 
Special police, arrest power on specified 
property, §§ 67-12-4, 67-12-13. 
Traffic rules and regulations, arrest for vio-
lation, § 41-6-169. 
Water law, arrest powers of state engineer 
and water commissioners, § 73-2-9. 
Weights and measures, arrest powers of de-
partment, § 4-9-7. 
—Misdemeanor. 
Officer could not legally make arrest without 
warrant for "good cause" in misdemeanor cases 
unless offense was committed or attempted in 
his presence, and arrest was made immedi-
ately or within reasonable time thereafter. 
Oleson v. Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P.23 
(1926). 
Plea of guilty to misdemeanor did not legal-
ize unlawful arrest without warrant nor bar 
action against arresting officer for false impris-
onment, if offense was not committed in offi-
cer's presence or arrest was not made immedi-
ately or within reasonable time. Oleson v. 
Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P. 23 (1926). 
Authority to sign complaint 
District judge improperly dismissed com-
plaint signed by officer other than arresting 
officer since this section deals only with the 
subject of making arrest and not with filing of 
complaints and is not, therefore, authority for 
proposition that only arresting officer has au-
thority to sign complaint. Salt Lake City v. 
Hanson, 19 Utah 2d 32, 425 P.2d 773 (1967). 
False imprisonment 
If a sheriff in making an arrest was not able 
to justify the same under some of the provi-
sions of this section, it was false and unlawful, 
and he was liable in a civil action for false im-
prisonment. Johnson v. Leigh, 74 Utah 286, 
279 P. 501 (1929). 
A peace officer would not necessarily be held 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Police Dog: Pos-
sibilities for Abuse in Finding Probable Cause 
for Arrest, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 408. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest §§ 4, 
24-33 44-49. 
C.J.S. — 6A C J.S. Arrest §§ 7-9,16-37, 51. 
A.L.R. — What amounts to violation of 
drunken driving statute in officer's "presence" 
or "view" so as to permit warrantless arrest, 74 
A.L.R.3d 1138. 
Key Numbers. — Arrest «=» 62, 63.1, 65, 67. 
77-7-3. By private persons. 
A private person may arrest another: 
(1) For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence; or 
(2) When a felony has been committed and he has reasonable cause to 
believe the person arrested has committed it. 
History: C. 1953, 77-7-3, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
Cross-References. — Force that may be 
used in making arrest, §§ 76-2-403, 77-7-7. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Arrest of robber. 
Right to make arrest. 
Arrest of robber. 
Where facts showing commission of robbery 
were reported to sheriffs posse, members 
thereof, although private citizens and non-resi-
dents of county, could follow, and capture by 
use of such force as necessary, persons who 
committed robbery. State v. Morgan, 22 Utah 
162, 61 P. 527 (1900). 
Private citizen approached by robber with 
gun was authorized to use whatever force was 
necessary to disarm defendant and prevent his 
escape. State v. Shockley, 29 Utah 25, 80 P. 
865, 110 Am. St. R. 639 (1905). 
Where defendant was told to put up his 
hands, he was, in effect, placed under arrest. 
State v. Shockley, 29 Utah 25, 80 P. 865, 110 
Am. St. R. 639 (1905). 
Right to make arrest 
Deputy sheriff, although out of his state, con-
stable, although out of his county, and their 
two companions, although not officers, under 
the circumstances, had right to arrest defen-
dant and his confederate in crime. People v. 
Coughlin, 13 Utah 58, 44 P. 94 (1896). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest 
§§ 34-36. 
C.J.S. — 6A CJ.S. Arrest §§ 12*15. 
A.L.R. — Private person's authority, in 
making arrest for felony, to shoot or kill al-
leged felon, 32 A.L.R.3d 1078. 
Liability of private citizen, calling on police 
for assistance after disturbance or trespass, for 
false arrest by officer, 98 A.LJt3d 542. 
Key Numbers. — Arrest *» 64. 
77-7-4. Magistrate may orally order arrest 
A magistrate may orally require a peace ofiBcer to arrest anyone commit-
ting or attempting to commit a public offense in the presence of the magis-
trate, and, in the case of an emergency, when probable cause exists, a magis-
trate may orally authorize a peace ofiBcer to arrest a person for a public 
offense, and thereafter, as soon as practical, an information shall be filed 
against the person arrested. 
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History: C. 1953, 77-7-4, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Assault in presence of 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. magistrate, § 77-3-10. 
77-7-5. Issuance of warrant — Time and place arrests may 
be made, 
A magistrate may issue a warrant for arrest upon finding probable cause to 
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense. If the 
offense charged is: 
( l ) a felony, the arrest upon a warrant may be made at any time of the 
day or night; or 
(2) a misdemeanor, the arrest upon a warrant can be made at night 
only if: 
(a) the magistrate has endorsed authorization to do so on the war-
rant; 
(b) the person to be arrested is upon a public highway or in a 
public place or a place open to or accessible to the public; or 
(c) the person to be arrested is encountered by a peace officer in the 
regular course of that peace officer's investigation of a criminal of-
fense unrelated to the misdemeanor warrant for arrest. 
History: C. 1953, 77-7-5, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Fee of constable exe-
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1987, ch. 103, § 1. cuting arrest warrant, § 21-3-3.5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- Rules of evidence inapplicable to proceedings 
ment designated the former provisions of Sub- for issuance of warrant for arrest, Rule 1101, 
section (2) as Subsection (2)(a) and added U.R.E. 
present Subsections (2)(b) and (2)(c). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 79. 
C.J.S. — 6A C.J.S. Arrest § 51. 
Key Numbers. — Arrest «=» 67. 
77-7-5.5. Fee for warrant service. 
(1) When a warrant is served, as a supplement to any bail posted, bail 
forfeited, fine imposed, or other assessment, a fee of $85 shall be collected 
from all persons for whom the warrant is issued by a court of record in the 
state. However, the court may choose not to impose the fee if good cause is 
shown. 
(2) The fee is payable to the clerk of the court. 
(3) The fee is refundable to the person named on the warrant if the court 
finds that the warrant was improperly issued or invalid when executed. 
(4) The fee under this section shall be distributed: 
(a) first, $35 to the General Fund; and 
(b) second, $50 to the general fund of the governmental entity effecting 
satisfaction of the warrant. 
History: C. 1953, 77-7-5.5, enacted by L. became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
1988, ch. 152, § 16. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 152 
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77-7-6. Manner of making arrest. 
The person making the arrest shall inform the person being arrested of his 
intention, cause and authority to arrest him. Such notice shall not be required 
when: •' M 
(1) There is reason to believe the notice will endanger the life or safety 
of the officer or another person or will likely enable the party being 
arrested to escape; --\^ 
(2) The person being arrested is actually engaged in the commission 'of, 
or an attempt to commit, an offense; or 
(3) The person being arrested is pursued immediately after the com-
mission of an offense or an escape. 
History: C. 1953, 77-7-6, enacted by L. forcement, immunity from liability for injury 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. by, § 18-1-1. 
Cross-References. — Dogs used in law en-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Failure to give notice. 
Notice not required. 
Response of person arrested. 
Failure to give notice. 
In a false imprisonment action, a plain 
clotbes security officer who accosted a cus-
tomer was not justified on the basis of privilege 
to make an arrest for assault or suspected 
shoplifting where no timely explanation was 
given. McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., 678 P.2d 298 
(Utah 1984). 
Notice not required. 
Private persons were not required to give no-
tice of their intention to arrest defendant and 
his confederate in crime, where latter, when 
first seen, were engaged in commission of crim-
inal act. People v. Coughlin, 13 Utah 58, 44 P. 
94 (1896). < «: 
Response of person arrested. iq 
Where the defendant's response to the officer 
who arrested him was voluntary and spontane-
ous and was not prompted by custodial interro-
gation, there was no violation of this section. 
State v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1985). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest 
§§ 69-72. 
C.J.S. — 6A CJ.S. Arrest §§ 45, 47, 48. 
AX.R. — Necessity that Miranda warnings 
include express reference to right to have at-
torney present during interrogation, 77 A.L.R 
Fed. 123. 
Key Numbers. — Arrest «=» 68. 
77-7-7. Force in making arrest. 
If a person is being arrested and flees or forcibly resists after being informed 
of the intention to make the arrest, the person arresting may use reasonable 
force to effect the arrest. Deadly force may be used only as provided in Section 
76-2-404. 
"V History: C. 1953, 77-7-7, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
Cross-References. — Force which peace of-
ficer may use in making arrest, § 76-2-404. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Applicability. of restitution for premises. Marks v. Sullivan, 
—Writ of restitution. 9 Utah 12, 33 P. 224 (1893). 
Section applied to a constable serving a writ 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest felon, right of peace officer to use, 83 A.L.R.3d 
§§ 80-85. 174. 
C.J.S. — 6A CJ.S. Arrest § 49. Peace officer's liability for death or personal 
A.L.R* — Excessive force used in accom- injuries caused by intentional force in arrest-
plishing lawful arrest, right to resist, 77 fag misdemeanant, 83 A.L.R.3d 238. 
A.L.R.3d 281. Key Numbers. — Arrest *> 68. 
Deadly force in attempting to arrest fleeing 
77-7-8. Doors and windows may be broken, when. 
To make an arrest, a private person, if the offense is a felony, and in all 
cases, a peace officer, may break the door or window of the building in which 
the person to be arrested is, or in which there are reasonable grounds for 
believing him to be. Before making the break, the person shall demand admis-
sion and explain the purpose for which admission is desired. Demand and 
explanation need not be given before breaking under the exceptions in Section 
77-7-6 or where there is reason to believe evidence will be secreted or de-
stroyed. 
History: C. 1953, 77-7-8, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Felony in progress. was not justifiable, even though he did not first 
Officers could break open doors of building at demand admittance and explain his purpose, 
night where they had reasonable grounds to State v. Williams, 49 Utah 320, 163 P. 1104 
believe a felony was being committed therein, (1917). 
and assault with deadly weapon upon officer 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest C.J.S. — 6A CJ.S. Arrest §§ 54-56. 
§§ 86-93. Key Numbers. — Arrest *» 68. 
77-7-9. Weapons may be taken from prisoner. 
Any person making an arrest may seize from the person arrested all 
weapons which he may have on or about his person. 
History: C. 1953, 77-7-9, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Property taken from 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. arrested person, receipt for, § 77-24-5. 
457 
ADDENDUM B 
1 A Nineteen years, 
2 Q And what~ are your duties? 
3 A I work in auto theft. 
4 Q What is your training, sir? 
5 A I've been a police officer for 19 years, I don't know 
5 what you mean by training. 
7 Q What training have you had to become a, police Qffice£? 
8 | A Oh, I was—went through POST and was certified as a 
9 J police officer, 
10 
12 
14 
15 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q Thank you. Did you happen to be on duty in the early 
o lx morning hours of the 19th of May, 1990? 
A No. I wasn't on duty. 
13 Q What were you involved with at that time? 
A I was working or was assisting Channel 4 News. They 
were in the process of doing some filming and I was taking them 
16 around. 
Q Was this a police-related activity? 
A Yes. 
Q And did you happen to be in the vicinity around Fifth 
South and Seventh East? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Is that in Salt Lake County? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Did anything unusual take place at that time and place? 
A Yes, sir. As we were southbound on Seventh East, 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
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1 approximately 450 South on 700 East, we observed two individuals 
2 standing on the corner on the, would be the southeast corner of 
3 Seventh East, and they were quite vocal, making quite a bit of 
4 noise. 
5 Q And then what happened? 
6 A As we passed through the intersection, we slowed down, 
7 still watching the traffic and also watching the two individuals, 
8 the light was red. I observed a man walking east on Seventh East 
9 from Trolley Square. As he reached the east side of Seventh 
10 East, one of the two men came out after him and started swinging 
11 at him. At that time, 1 pulled my car up over the island and 
12 made a U-turn and was now facing north on 700 East. 
13 Q And after you made your turn and facing in that 
14 direction, what happened in relationship to the two individuals 
15 you were observing? 
16 A I stopped approximately 100, 150 feet south of the 
17 intersection. I was parked next to some barricades, I was 
18 parked directly in front of Mullboon's. The two individuals came 
19 running up to the car, as I got out of the car, I identified 
20 myself as a police officer, I wasn't in uniform* Told them they 
21 had to get out of the street. They started walking back towards 
22 the street, I could see that they were very intoxicated, and they 
23 had—the one individual, the larger of the two, said something 
24 but I couldn't understand what he was saying. And they started 
25 walking back towards the sidewalk. I got back in my vehicle at 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
that time. 
I requested a back, and gave my location, but I gave 
the wrong location. When I realized I'd given the wrong 
location, I corrected myself and was telling the dispatcher what 
my correct location was; at that time, a barricade came through 
the side window, or the passenger side window of my car. 
Q When you say a barricade, sir, what is that, exactly? 
A It's a street barricade, the little sawhorse type with 
a little reflector on it, it's made out of metal with wood 
across the top of it,— 
Q And what did — 
A —painted black and white. 
Q I'm sorry. And where did it hit your car? 
A The barricade came through the passenger, right passenge^ 
front window and also punched a hole in the front door. 
Q Were there other people in the car with you? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q What was the result-of that barricade hitting your car? 
A One of the passengers received glass in her eye, and 
no one else was injured. 
Q And then what happened? 
A At that time, I asked where my back was, and Officer 
23
 J Rowley indicated that he had arrived but couldn't find me. I 
* • indicated that—I checked to make sure that he had gone to the 
correction location, not the one I'd given originally. Just as I 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
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1
 indicated—I told him where we were a second time, I saw him, I 
2 indicated that the two people involved were on the sidewalk. At 
3 that time, they saw the car and they started running east through 
4 the parking lot of Utah Idaho Supply, School Supply. 
5 Q And what action did you take? 
6 A I got out of my car and chased them through the parking 
7 lot, they went up over the fence and I went up over the fence 
8 also. The larger individual was apprehended by myself and 
9 Officer Bigelow, the other one continued running. 
10 Q And did you identify the larger individual? 
11 A He was later identified as a Gabriel Ramirez. 
12 Q And the—the barricade hitting your car; what did these 
13 two individuals have to do with that? 
14 A At that time, I didn't know which one, but one of them 
15 had thrown the barricade through the car. 
16 MR. UPDEGROVE: Thank you. 
17 THE COURT: Is that all the questions you have, 
18 Mr. Updegrove? 
19 MR. UPDEGROVE: Yes. I'm sorry, sir. At the moment. 
20 THE COURT: Maybe we can interrupt for just a minute 
21 and see where we are? Not quite ready on this one? 
22 * All right. Mr. Steele, you can go ahead with cross-
23 e x a m i n a t i o n . 
24 (Whereupon, t h e Cour t hand l ed an u n r e l a t e d m a t t e r . ) 
25 THE COURT: A l l r i g h t , Mr. S t e e l e , c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n of 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101 
9 
10 
1
 O f f i c e r Smi th . 
2
 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
3
 BY MR. STEELE; 
4
 Q Officer Smith, when the—the two males took off, you— 
5
 you followed Gabriel and caught him, that's the person you 
6
 apprehended; that's right? 
7
 A I followed both of them until they split, but yes. 
8
 I Q You didn't choose to follow Livio, you chose the 
larger individual? 
A Yes. 
^ Q Okay. The reason you chose him was you suspected he 
12
 had thrown the barricade? He was— 
13
 A Yes. I believed he was the one who threw it, but I 
14
 didn't know who had thrown it. 
15
 Q He was the one who had been vocal at you, you weren't 
16
 sure what he said, but he was the one that yelled at you? 
17 A He was the one who was the most aggressive and the one 
18
 who was swinging at the other individual, but they were both 
19 v o c a l . 
20 Q Did L i v i o y e l l a t you a t t h a t — a t t h a t t ime? 
21 A Which t ime was t h a t ? 
22 Q When you s a i d you a p p r o a c h e d , o r t h a t t h e two males 
23 a p p r o a c h e d y o u , and Gabby y e l l e d someth ing a t you , t h e l a r g e r 
2 4
 one y e l l e d something a t you. 
25 A Oh, I d o n ' t know. L i v i o was t h e r e , and I d o n ' t know i f 
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1 Q Then what happened? 
2 A Okay. At that point, Officer Smith continued through 
3 the back lot where the fence was and got out of his car. I 
4 decided to go up Hawthorne Avenue, which is on the south of that 
5 fence. 
6 Q Well, let's—let's stop there for a second. Who was 
7 riding with—who, if anyone, was riding with you? 
8 A The two individuals that were running at the time, were 
9 later identified as Gabby and his brother, Livio, Ramirez. 
10 is that who you're asking? 
11 Q No. No, sir. I said, who, if anyone, was riding with 
12 you on that— 
13 A Oh, riding with me? It was just Officer Bigelow. 
14 Q And what did Officer Bigelow do, before you went up 
15 Hawthorne? 
16 A He—he just observed the two people running across, 
17 pointed them out to me, I was driving, so I made a decision to 
18 go around the other side of the fence. 
19 Q Did Officer Bigelow stay in the car with you? 
20 A At that point, yes. 
21 Q When did he depart the car? 
22 A As we pulled up Hawthorne Avenue, Gabby Ramirez had 
23 slipped and fallen in front of the car in a driveway on Hawthorne 
24 Avenue. I stopped, Officer Bigelow got out and started to 
25 apprehend him. Officer Smith had come over the fence and 
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1 assisted him in apprehending Gabby Ramirez. 
2 I continued on after the other individual that split 
3 from that location. 
4 Q Could you still see him? 
5 A Yes. They both split from the same location. 
6 Q Okay. 
7 A Do you want me to continue? 
8 Q Please. 
9 A Okay. The individual seated at the defense counsel 
10 there, Livio Ramirez, had run to the east location of a vacant 
11 lot, where some houses were taken out on Hawthorne Avenue, and 
12 it's vacant from Hawthorne, which is 550 South, all the way to 
13 Sixth South. He continued along the east fence of that lot, 
14 and I went through the only roadway, a dirt roadway that was 
15 made there by the construction crew. And he continued across 
16 the street to Sixth South and into a house, approximately 736 
17 East Sixth South. 
18 As he crossed the street, I pulled my car up to the 
19 curb, jumped out of the car and chased him into that residence. 
20 Q How soon after the individual you were chasing entered 
21 the home did you follow? 
22 A Couldn't have been more than ten to 12 seconds. 
23 Q And did you confront that individual in the home once 
24 you were there? 
25 A Okay. I entered the front door of the house, in the 
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living room. He was standing in the kitchen area of the house, 
which was very dark, and a dog apparently— 
Q Well, let's not get into the dog. 
A Okay. Well, anyway, he was—I confronted him as he 
approached the doorway of the kitchen area facing the living room. 
He could—we visually had visual contact with each other at that 
point. 
Q Was the individual you confronted in the home the same 
individual you chased? 
A Yes. 
Q Is that individual present in the courtroom? 
A Yes. He's at defense table there with Mr. Steele. 
Q Thank you. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Your Honor, may the record reflect he's 
identified the defendant? 
THE COURT: It will. 
17
 I MR. UPDEGROVE: I think that's all I have at the moment, 
1
 your Honor. 
19
 I MR. STEELE: If I could have just one moment, please, 
THE COURT: Sure. 
2 1
 I CROSS-EXAMINATION 
2 2
 BY MR. STEELE: 
23 
24 
25 
Q O f f i c e r Rowley— 
A Yes . 
Q —do you remember what the call for assistance was, the 
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 contact call? 
2 A Well, there was a—originally a call to assist with a 
3 drunk, and then the call called for it to speed up the back-up 
4 'cause he was having problems. 
5 Q So, the first time you saw Livio, he was pointed out to 
6 you by Officer Bigelow; is that right? 
7 A He pointed out two individuals. He didn't point 
8 Mr. Livio, as per se; both individuals were running across 
9 Seventh East to that location I said earlier to the prosecutor, 
10 Q And you didn't see him prior to that time at all? 
11 A The first time I saw two individuals as they ran 
12 across Seventh East, that's correct. 
13 Q And you—Livio ran into a house and you followed him 
14 immediately into a residence, it was a residence? 
15 A It was a duplex, or a residence, yes. 
16 Q But you—you weren't in a common area of a duplex, you 
17 were in someone's half of that duplex? 
18 A I don't understand what you mean by common area. 
19 Q Excuse me, Officer. Some—some duplexes may have a 
20 common entrance, and then door—doors inside the complex. 
21 A Oh. This—this has a separated porch, is that what 
22 you're asking? Yes. 
23 Q Yes. 
24 A Okay. 
25 Q And L i v i o was i n a d a r k p o r t i o n of t h e k i t c h e n a r e a ? 
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1 that there would be no way for Officer Rowley to know which of 
2 the two running away would be that intoxicated individual that 
3 had been causing the problems, but neither did he have any— 
4 any indication that Livio had committed some sort of a crime. 
5 There—then upon getting to the residence, he had no 
6 probable cause in exigent circumstances upon which to enter. 
7 There's no offense that Livio was fleeing from at that point, 
8 no evidence about to be destroyed, and even Officer Rowley 
9 suspected something had gone on, did not know what it was, said 
10 he suspected an assault; but all the information he had was an 
11 intoxicated individual and needing some back-up. 
12 I would point to Welsh v. Wisconsin, a United States 
13 Supreme Court case from 1984, talking about hot pursuit, and 
14 warrantless entry into a home for—under probable cause in 
15 exigent circumstances, that the gravity of the offense that 
16 they're following for has something to do with it, that it 
17 doesn't draw the line at misdemeanors versus felonies, but that's 
18 something that has to be weighed. 
19 Hot pursuit, has been allowed by the Supreme Court, 
20 U.S. v. Santana, for a fleeing felon,. Warden v. Hayden, another 
21 fleeing felon, or destruction of evidence, Smurder v. California. 
22 This is not one of those situations, nor was it assumed to be by 
23 O f f i c e r Rowley. 
24 They—the S t a t e canno t overcome t h e p r e s u m p t i v e 
25 u n r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of a w a r r a n t l e s s e n t r y i n t o a p e r s o n ' s home. 
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1 Under Welsh, there—the crime, if any, was a minor one* It's 
2 unclear that Livio had committed any crime, so under Welsh— 
3 under Welsh, it was the clear the person they were going after 
4 had committed a crime, or they had reasonable—reasonable cause. 
5 No crime had been committed in the arresting officer's presence, 
6 or pursuing officer's presence, no crime had been committed by 
7 Livio prior to the warrantless entry at all. 
8 The officer wanted to talk to Livio, which seems to me 
9 puts it under reasonable articulable suspicion in 77-7-15 to 
10 question concerning, Livio's activities at a scene. He may have— 
11 the officer may have had reasonable articulable suspicion to 
12 question Livio, but the statute itself says, may stop in a 
13 public place. He was not stopped in a public place. 
14 I would further argue that if the Court that—that this 
15 entry was good under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, that 
16 Article I, Section 14 would protect against such an entry. The 
17 Utah Supreme Court just recently, in Morrocco, found that in 
18 some circumstances, Article 1, Section 14 has broader protections 
19 than the Fourth Amendment. In Morrocco, itself, I would admit 
20 is a different case, but it's a vehicle search case requiring 
21 probable cause in exigent circumstances for an entry and search. 
22 The officers just did not have enough. They had perhaps 
23 reasonable articulable suspicion but that is not enough under 
24 Welsh or under Morrocco to enter a home following someone. 
25 And I would submit it on that, your Honor. 
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 THE COURT: Let me just ask a question because it's not 
2
 clear, and I don't know much about the facts of the case, we 
3
 didn't get much beyond the officer's entry into the duplex, I 
4 guess it was a duplex. What evidence are you seeking to suppress 
5 here? 
6 MR. STEELE: Your Honor, I—that's—that's a good 
7 question. There—everything that Livio is charged with happened 
8 after the entry. One of the charges is assault on a peace 
9 officer, the other is resisting arrest. It seems to me the 
10 purpose of the exclusionary rule is to give limits to police 
11 conduct, not necessarily to function as a rule of evidence, but 
12 to say can't enter the home under these circumstances. 
13 So we would be asking under the purpose of the 
14 exclusionary rule that no crimes had been committed, that—that 
15 the evidence of the crimes having been committed should be 
16 excluded because they happened after the entry by the officer, 
17 and that absent his entry, there could have been no arrest, and 
18 certainly that charge—I mean, he couldn't have resisted, if the 
19 officer hadn't—could not have entered. 
20 THE COURT: So what you're really saying, 'cause this 
21 is different than a normal situation, as I understand it, and 
22 just reading the probable cause statement, the alleged offense 
23 is an assault upon Officer Rowley. And what you're saying, in 
24 essence is, that because his entry was illegal, at least according 
25 to your argument, that the crime ought to be dismissed. 
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MR, STEELE: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: In effect saying the conduct the defendant 
committed was justified because of the illegal entry; isn't that 
really what you're saying? 
MR. STEELE: Yes. I think so. 
THE COURT: Sort of like you can use a certain amount 
of force to repel an unlawful assault or an unlawful arrest even 
by a police officer? 
MR. STEELE: Yes, and I—the reasonableness of his 
action do have to be considered, I think, and perhaps I should 
have put him on the stand, and perhaps we should have developed 
that into the testimony. 
THE COURT: It's just a little different than the 
usual suppression. 
MR. STEELE: Yes. 
THE COURT: We're really not suppressing evidence, 
I 'cause the evidence is as I understand the probable cause 
statement, where he said, "Sic 'em" or something to that 
effect? 
20
 I MR. STEELE: Yes. 
21
 I THE COURT: So, it's really dismiss the crime, that's 
the motion, alleging that the—because the entry may have been 
unlawful, that the defendant's conduct was justified, and 
therefore, it's a defense of justification to the crime itself. 
Isn't that really what you're saying? 
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1 biggest stumbling block I have from what I've heard so far is 
2 that normally, we just don't dismiss cases at a pretrial 
3 evidentiary hearing based on a defense of justification, 
4 Usually, that's an affirmative defense that's presented at the 
5 trial and left for the trier of fact after hearing all the 
6 evidence from both sides to decide whether there was 
7 justification, and really, that's what it seems to me you're 
8 asking me to do here. 
9 How would you address that? How would this be 
10 appropriate for a pretrial motion? 
11 MR- STEELE: Your Honor, I mean this—that's—that's a 
12 difficult question to answer, but I would turn it around and tell 
13 the Court that I can't really address it at trial, either, 
14 because an illegal entry, unless the Court made a finding that 
15 the entry was illegal, that's not something a jury can determine, 
16 or all that would be irrelevant to the jury. So, at trial, the 
17 issue of whether the officer should have been there or not is 
18 irrelevant there. 
19 So, I'm caught between two difficult points. 
20 THE CODRT: The entry certainly is a legal question. 
21 MR. STEELE: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: And what you're saying is that what—what 
23 you'd have to do on most, if instruct the jury, if I found that 
24 the entry was illegal, would be to instruct them that it was 
25 illegal and then you could argue, that because of the illegal 
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 entry, he was justified in using the force that, he did, if he 
2 sicced the dog, or whatever he did, I didn't hear any of those 
3 facts. Okay? 
4 Anything else on that point? 
5 MR. STEELE: And I would just point to my claim for the 
6 purpose of the exclusionary rule, it isn't a Rule of Evidence, 
7 it's a rule designed to have a legal control over the limits of 
8 the police officer's activities. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MR. STEELE: And I don't think this is—this is an 
11 unusual application of that, but not outside of that purpose. 
12 THE COURT: Outside of the purpose of the rule, of the 
13 enforcement. 
14 I'm going to take it under advisement and take a look 
15 at both of those issues, it seems to me there are two, and that 
16 number one, as I've already said, is a motion to dismiss based 
17 on the defense of justification appropriate at this juncture, 
18 should it be reserved as a question of fact for the trier of 
19 fact after, I guess, I make some threshold finding as to whether 
20 or not the entry was legal or illegal, and then the follow-up to 
21 that, was the entry justified as being in hot pursuit? And I'll 
22 look at the three cases that you've cited. 
23 I'll ask you to supply me if you would, though, with 
24 a copy of Morrocco, in fact, maybe you should also give me 
25 Welsh, if you would, and maybe would you mind giving me a copy 
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